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FCC REGULATION

of the public airwaves. Nevertheless, the Court in Cohen rejected this
justification for censorship. Freedom of speech, it said, also includes offensive speech, and putting up with the latter is the price that must be paid for
the former. 139
The Court in Miller reaffirmed the holding in Roth that the first
amendment does not protect obscene speech-a position that has been
vigorously disputed on both sides." 4° Nevertheless, the Burger Court has
shown no willingness to create another category of unprotected speech.
Rowan demonstrated the Court's concern for the unconsenting adult, but the
Court has elswhere noted that " '[t]he radio can be turned off. ....,"141
Erznoznik demonstrated that the goal of protecting children from offensive
material will not be allowed to override the first amendment interests of
adults. On the basis of these precedents, it seems unlikely that the FCC will
be successful in its attempts to sanitize the language used in some of our
most important public fora-the broadcast media.
JAMES M. LANE

Federal Jurisdiction-Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.:
The Interface of the Clayton Act and the Anti-Injunction Act
In Vendo Co. v. Lektro- Vend Corp.,I the United States Supreme Court
had, and failed to take advantage of, the opportunity to define more clearly
the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,2 which
prohibits the enjoining of state court proceedings. Specifically, the Court
had before it the issue whether section 16 of the Clayton Act,3 which
139. Id. at 24-26.
140. See generally Symposium, Obscenity and the Law, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275 (1977).
141. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting Packer Corp. v.
Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
1. 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
2. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
3. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26 (West Cum. Supp. 1977), provides in pertinent
part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have
injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including
sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and
principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage
is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon
the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted
and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue . . ..
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provides private injunctive relief in federal courts against Sherman Antitrust
Act 4 violations, qualifies as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. In its
attempt to construe section 2283, the Court became so embroiled in the
language of the statute and the case law interpreting it that it all but ignored
the policy behind the Act-'"to prevent needless friction between state and
federal courts." 5 The ultimate determination of the issue in Vendo may
reflect this policy, but the focus of the opinions raises the question whether
section 2283 has become so mechanically applied that it has lost its effectiveness.
The case came before the federal courts 6 when Lektro-Vend, Harry B.
Stoner and Stoner Investments brought an antitrust action against Vendo. As
part of that action, plaintiffs prayed that Vendo be temporarily enjoined
from collecting a seven million dollar judgment granted it by the Illinois
Supreme Court.7 Vendo had obtained the Illinois judgment in a suit brought
against Stoner for breach of a covenant against competition in his employment contract. 8 It was this restrictive covenant, along with the state court
action to enforce it, that formed the basis of the alleged antitrust violation in
Stoner's federal action. 9 The district court granted the injunction, finding
"evidence that Vendo had used litigation as a method of harassing and
eliminating competition."'" The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed." Both courts held that section 16 of the Clayton
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939).
6. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. III. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d

1050 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
7. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 III. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 975

(1975).
8. Vendo purchased Stoner Manufacturing Company from Harry B. Stoner and gave him
a five year employment contract that included a ten year, world-wide restrictive covenant
against competition. While employed by Vendo, Stoner, as an individual and through his
company Stoner Investments, invested in the embryonic Lektro-Vend Corporation. Stoner's
financial support and public backing of Lektro-Vend formed the basis of Vendo's state court
action against Stoner. 403 F. Supp. at 530-31.
9. A peripheral aspect of the Vendo litigation was the question whether the federal

antitrust laws can be asserted as an affirmative defense in the state courts. Lektro-Vend and
Stoner tried to assert such a defense at the trial level in the Illinois courts; this defense was
ordered stricken. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 545 F.2d at 1054 n.4. Although this ruling
was reversed on appeal, Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 III. App. 2d 261, 245 N.E.2d 263 (1969),

Lektro-Vend and Stoner withdrew the defense in the second round of the state court litigation.
545 F.2d at 1054 n.4.

The jurisdiction of state courts to hear federal antitrust defenses has been a matter of some
dispute. See Recent Cases, State Court Denies Jurisdictionin ContractAction to HearDefense
of Illegality Based on FederalAntitrust Laws, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1135 (1961). Justice Stevens, in
his dissenting opinion and without any dispute from the majority, appears to have assumed that

the state court did, indeed, have such authority. See 97 S. Ct. at 2904 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although this attitude on the part of the Court would appear to open up the state courts for

the assertion of federal antitrust defenses, it may be of limited utility. State courts cannot
accord full relief under the antitrust laws, id., a fact that will probably encourage persons so
aggrieved to continue to seek their remedies in the federal courts.
10. 403 F. Supp. at 534.
11. 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Act was an "expressly authorized" exception to section 2283, when, as
here, the state court action is itself part of the anticompetitive scheme. 12 The
district court further held that the injunction was "necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction," and therefore permissible under section 2283.13
The Supreme Court, in a splintered decision, reversed. 4 Justice Rehn15
quist, writing the opinion of the Court in which two other justices joined,
held that section 16 is not an "expressly authorized" exception to section
16
2283, and that the district court did not act "in aid of its jurisdiction."'
Justice Stevens wrote for the four dissenters 17 who found section 16 injunctions to be expressly authorized exceptions to section 2283.18 Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger conceded that section 16 can be an expressly
authorized exception to section 2283, but cast the deciding votes denying
that the bringing of the Illinois suit was not a
the injunction 19 on the ground 20
Act.
Sherman
the
violation of
12. Id. at 1055; 403 F. Supp. at 536. Before Vendo, few courts squarely faced the issue of
whether § 16 is an exception to § 2283. A few lower courts have denied § 16 injunctions against
state court actions, but they have generally done so on the grounds that the state action sought
to be enjoined is not a violation of the Sherman Act. See Response of Carolina v. Leasco
Response, Inc., 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Red Rock Cola Co.
v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952); cf. Helfenbein v. International Indus.,
Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 879 (1971) (suggesting that had the state suit
been an antitrust violation, the injunction would have been granted).
13. See note 2 supra. The district court held that collection of the judgment would place
controversy.
the two corporate plaintiffs under Vendo's control, thereby eliminating the case ol"
403 F. Supp. at 535.
14. 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
15. Justices Stewart and Powell.
16. 97 S. Ct. at 2893.
17. Justices Stevens, Brennan, White and Marshall.
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2898 (dissent).
19. The concurrence of Blackmun and Burger created an anomalous result. Six justices
(Blackmun, Burger, Stevens, White, Marshall and Brennan) found § 16 to be an expressly
authorized exception, and seven (Stevens, White, Marshall, Brennan, Rehnquist, Stewart and
Powell) possibly conceded that the state court action could have been found to be a Sherman
Act violation. The plurality opinion did not reach the question. See id. at 2889 n.6. But because
of the three-way split, the injunction was struck down.
20. Id. at 2893-94 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's opinion relies on
Supreme Court cases granting governmental dealings immunity. In Eastern R.R. Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), the Court held that political lobbying is not a Sherman
Act violation, even if the political activity incidentally results in a restraint on trade. Individuals
and groups have the right to petition and attempt to influence their government; the Sherman
Act may not interfere with this political sphere. This immunity was extended in UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), to include attempts to influence administrative officials, even
with an anticompetitive intent.
In California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the Court
invoked the "sham" exception recognized by Noerr and limited the immunity. "[T]here may be
instances where the alleged conspiracy 'is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.'"' Id. at 511 (quoting Eastern R.R. Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 144) (citation omitted). The Court distinguished the
political campaign of Noerr, in which misrepresentation and unethical tactics are to be expected, and the bringing of litigation in CaliforniaTransport:"Misrepresentations, condoned in the
political arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." Id. at 513.
Justice Blackmun contended that the present action does not qualify as an exception to the

604
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Congress enacted section 2283 as part of the Judiciary Act of 1793.21
The original provision allowed no exceptions on its face. 22 This seemingly
absolute prohibition did not prevent federal court judges from molding
necessary modifications; injunctive relief under six federal statutes was
universally accepted before 1941.23 Federal courts were also willing to
enjoin state cases involving the same res over which a federal court had first
acquired jurisdiction,2 4 state court judgments obtained by fraud,2 5 and cases
in which parties attempted to litigate issues in state court already decided in
26
federal suits.
In a startling turnabout in 1941, Justice Frankfurter, in his opinion for
the Court in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,27 held that the
statutory exceptions and the res exception were the only ones to be recognized by the federal courts. 28 Congress reacted to this change in judicial
attitude by amending the statute29 to except from the general prohibition
those injunctions "expressly authorized by Act of Congress, 30 or where
immunity conferred under California Transport because "a pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims or some equivalent showing of grave abuse of the state courts must exist before an
injunction would be proper. No such finding was made by the District Court in this case." 97 S.
Ct. at 2893 n.*. This is a narrow reading of California Transport. See Associated Radio Serv.
Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
21. Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334.
22. "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be [granted by any court of the United States) to stay
proceedings in any court of a state .... ." Id.
23. These exceptions were bankruptcy, removal, limitation of shipowner's liability, interpleader, the Frazier-Lemke Farm-Mortgage Act, and habeas corpus proceedings. See C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 47, at 203 nn.31 & 32 (3d ed. 1976).
24. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
25. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
26. See Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904).
27. 314 U.S. 118 (1941), rev'g on rehearing 313 U.S. 538 (1940) (per curiam) (mem.).
28. Id. at 139. Toucey involved a question of relitigation. Toucey brought an action in
state court against defendant insurance company in 1935 for reinstatement of his insurance
policy on the ground that the company had fraudulently cancelled by concealing from Toucey a
provision that if he were to become disabled, premiums were waived. Toucey claimed he was
disabled in 1933 and that the company cancelled his policy for nonpayment of premiums. The
case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds. The federal district court dismissed the
action, finding that Toucey was not disabled. There was no appeal. Id. at 126-27.
In 1937, Shay, purporting to be Toucey's assignee, brought the same action against the
insurance company in the Missouri state courts. The insurance company brought an action in
the federal district court to enjoin that action and any further actions by Toucey on the policy.
The injunction was granted on the grounds that the federal court had already ruled against
Toucey on the essential question of his purported disability. The district court held that the antiinjunction provision did not bar a federal injunction of state court actions when necessary to
"effectuate the lawful decrees of the federal courts." Id. at 127. The Supreme Court, after
initially affirming by an equally divided vote, 313 U.S. 538 (1940) (per curiam) (mem.), reversed
on rehearing, holding the relitigation exception invalid. 314 U.S. at 139-41.
29. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2283, 62 Stat. 869. The Reviser's Note indicates that
the amendment "restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the
Toucey decision." 28 U.S.C. § 2283, Reviser's Note (1970).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (footnote added). Lektro-Vend claimed, and the district court
found, that an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act is "expressly authorized by Act of
Congress." 403 F. Supp. at 536.
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necessary in aid of [the federal court's] jurisdiction, 3 1 or to protect or
effectuate [the federal court's] judgments.'32
It is this more detailed statute that the Court had to consider in Vendo.
Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court, dealt primarily with the
"expressly authorized" exception of section 2283, which he held inapplicable.33 Justice Rehnquist recognized that a statute need not refer to either
section 2283 or a state court proceeding to qualify as an exception. He
observed, however, that the statutes that have been held exceptions "necessarily interact with or focus upon, a state judicial proceeding." 34 The
removal process, for example, stays state court proceedings by its very
nature. 35 Section 16, by contrast, merely extends to private parties the right
to seek injunctive relief against antitrust violations; it in no way "focuses"
36
upon state court actions.
This requirement of "focus" is closely connected with the test for an
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (footnote added). The Reviser's Note indicates that this
second exception allows injunctions in connection with the removal of actions to federal courts.
Id., Reviser's Note. Justice Rehnquist had a different theory; he cited C. WRIGHT, supra note
23, § 47, at 204, to support his contention that this exception refers to the in rem exception. 97
S. Ct. at 2892.
In Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the
"necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception allowed an injunction "where Congress. . .has
vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject matter and the intrusion of a
state would result in conflict of functions." Id. at 504. Accordingly, the employer was enjoined
by the federal court from enforcing a state court injunction of union activity, clearly not an in
rem action. The Supreme Court again addressed the jurisdiction exception in Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). "[I]t is not enough that
the requested injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but it must be 'necessary in aid of' that
jurisdiction." Id. at 295. The exception implies "that some federal injunctive relief may be
necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or
disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide
that case." Id. As in CapitalService, the case involved the enjoining of union activity, certainly
not a situation involving the in rem exception.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The third exception is designed to prevent relitigation in state
courts of issues already resolved in federal courts-the situation involved in the Toucey case.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 23, § 47, at 204.
33. 97 S. Ct. at 2893. Rehnquist also held that the injunction could not be sustained on §
2283's second exception-that the injunction was necessary in aid of the district court's
jurisdiction. Rehncluist suggested that this language refers only to in rem actions. Id. at 2892.
The Supreme Court, however, has used the exception to allow injunctions of in personam
actions. See note 31 supra. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist is probably correct in his conclusion that the facts of the case do not warrant application of the exception. Even if collection of
the state court judgment were to reduce the corporate plaintiffs to Vendo satellites, Harry
Stoner as an individual plaintiff could preserve the case or controversy, and the court's
jurisdiction would be intact.
34. 97 S. Ct. at 2892.
35. While traditionally the removal of a case from state to federal court stayed all
proceedings in the state court, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1970), in 1977 the statute was amended to
provide in the case of criminal prosecutions that the state court proceeding can continue, but no
judgment of conviction may be entered unless, and until, the federal court denies the removal
petition. Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 3, 91 Stat. 320 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §
1446(c)(3) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977)).
36. 97 S. Ct. at 2888.
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expressly authorized exception developed in Mitchum v. Foster.37 The
Mitchum Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 198338 is an expressly authorized
exception under section 2283. The test articulated by that Court "is whether
an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in
a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay
of a state court proceeding." 39 The Court in Mitchum relied on the legislative history of section 1983, which clearly showed congressional concern
that state courts would be used to deprive citizens of their federally protected
rights.' Because this concern was a basic factor in the enactment of section
1983, the Court found that that provision could realize its "intended scope"
only if federal courts held injunctive power over state court actions that
41
violate it.
Because Congress was not overtly concerned with state court proceedings as violative of the Sherman Act when it enacted section 16 of the
Clayton Act, Justice Rehnquist denied the existence of an exception on the
ground that "[t]he critical aspects of the legislative history . . . are wholly
absent . . . . This void is not filled by other evidence of congressional
authorization. "42 Rehnquist rejected the possibility that the strong congressional policy and national interest in enforcing the antitrust laws could
conceivably fill the void.4 3 He instead maintained that "the importance of
the federal policy to be 'protected' by the injunction is not the focus of the
inquiry."44 Citing two earlier Supreme Court cases,4 5 he warned that section
2283 is not a principle of comity and federalism that allows federal courts to
balance federal and state interests, but a strict prohibition to be guarded from
46
judicial improvisation.
In the first of the cases cited by Rehnquist, Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America v. Richman Brothers Co., 7 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, held that a district court could not restrain a state court
from enjoining a labor union engaged in peaceful picketing. 48 Frankfurter
37. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13).
39. 407 U.S. at 238.

40. Id. at 240-42 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 361,374-76, 385, 416, 429,653
(1871)).
41.

Id. at 242-43.

42. 97 S. Ct. at 2888-89.
43.

Id. at 2889.

44. Id.
45. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970);
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).

46. 97 S. Ct. at 2893.
47. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).

48. The Court recognized that the state court had intruded into the federal domain created
by the Taft-Hartley Act. The suit, however, was brought by the union, a private party, and
therefore did not qualify as an express exception. Id. at 517. Section 101, § 10(j), (1) of the
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rejected the union's argument that the section 2283 bar applied only to cases
in which the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, finding
the "[l]egislative policy . . . expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified
only by specifically defined exceptions." 49 As section 2283 did not specifically list exclusive federal jurisdiction as one of its exceptions, the prohibition against injunctions applied.50
The second case Justice Rehnquist relied on, Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,51 also involved a labor
dispute. Again the Court denied federal power to restrain a state court
injunction against union picketing. Justice Black reiterated the Court's
position-a federal court may not interfere in a state court action "merely
because those proceedings interfere with a protected federal right or invade
an area preempted by federal law, even when the interference is unmistakably clear.' '52 The Court rejected the contention that the Act merely establishes a principle of comity; any injunction against state court proceedings
53
had to be based on a section 2283 exception.
Justice Stevens, speaking for the dissenters in Vendo, distinguished
that case from Atlantic CoastLine and Richman on the ground that neither
considered an allegation of an exception expressly authorized by act of
Congress. 54 Stevens was not trying to create an extrastatutory exception
based on the importance of federal antitrust policy, the sort of judicial
improvisation condemned by Atlantic CoastLine and Richman. Instead, he
argued that the language and history of the Clayton Act warrant a holding
that an injunction against state court action under section 16 is expressly
authorized by act of Congress, and is thus an exception included within the
55
language of section 2283.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the antitrust laws to evidence a
congressional desire for strong enforcement against violations in whatever
guise. 56 Stevens contended that this policy, coupled with the grant of federal
injunctive power in section 16, 57 constitutes an expressly authorized exception. 58 The language of the Sherman Act defining violations is deliberately
vague and intended to include "every conceivable act which could possibly
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (I) (1970), authorizes

injunctive relief only at the request of the NLRB.
49. 348 U.S. at 515-16.
50. Id. at 515-18.

51. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
52. Id. at 294.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 286-87.
97 S. Ct. at 2899 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
rd. at 2894-98.
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
See note 3 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2896-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law," 59 whether
or not the form of restraint was actually contemplated by Congress. From
this basis, Stevens reasoned that section 16 allows injunctions against
"violations of the Sherman Act," it has been judicially established that state
court actions may be such violations, 6° and therefore section 16 allows
injunctions against state court actions. 61 Stevens also maintained that the
statute qualifies as an exception under the Mitchum test. 62 Section 16 was
enacted to give private citizens an antitrust remedy before a violation
produces irreparable harm. 63 This "intended scope" will be defeated unless
the federal courts can restrain state court actions such as the Illinois action in
Vendo that cause such harm in violation of the Sherman Act. 64
Justice Stevens was accurate in his observation that neither Richman
nor Atlantic Coast Line dealt with situations involving the "expressly
authorized" exception to section 2283. The broad holding of both opinions
was that if an injunction cannot be classified under one of the stated
exceptions (as exclusive federal jurisdiction could not in these cases), the
prohibition is absolute. 6 These cases, however, should not be summarily
59. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
60. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972)
("concerted action . . . to institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat applications . . . to acquire operating rights"); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 360 F. Supp.
451, 451 (D. Minn. 1973) ("repetitive use of litigation . . . timed and designed principally to
prevent the establishment of municipal electric systems and thereby preserve defendant's
monopoly").
61. 97 S. Ct. at 2898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2899-901; see text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
63. 97 S. Ct. at 2900.
64. Id.
65. But see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (recognizing that federal intervention may be appropriate if the state court action is in bad faith, for the purposes of harassment
and threatens irreparable harm that is "'both great and immediate'" through violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926))). Justice
Stewart in his Mitchum decision noted the inconsistency of Younger with Atlantic Coast Line
and held that the portion of Younger recognizing an exception when the state court action
threatens constitutional rights would have to be overruled if § 1983 were not "expressly
authorized." 407 U.S. at 231; see text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
A second extrastatutory exception was established by the Supreme Court in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), and reaffirmed in NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404
U.S. 138 (1971). Both cases allowed an injunction of state court actions when the United States
as sovereign is the party seeking injunctive relief. The Leiter court upheld the injunction on the
ground that when the United States seeks a stay to prevent injury to a national interest, there is
less danger of state-federal conflict than there is when a private party is plaintiff. 352 U.S. at
225-26. Nash extended "sovereignty" to the NLRB as a public agency acting in the public
interest-the chosen instrument of protection. The rationale for this extension was that § 2283's
purpose is not "the frustration of federal systems of regulation." 404 U.S. at 146.
In Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit held that the
Leiter/Nash implied sovereignty exception should make the § 2283 bar inapplicable when the
federal action is based on a federal statute designed to protect the public sector through the
creation of private claims for relief. Id. at 697-98. The Studebaker court allowed an injunction
under § 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(e) (Supp. V 1975); the
court implied that the same result would be reached if the federal action were based on § 16 of
the Clayton Act. 360 F.2d at 698; cf. Tampa Phosphate R.R. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 418
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dismissed as totally inapplicable to the Vendo case. Together with Mitchurn, they are the most important indications of the Court's interpretation of
the 1948 amendment of section 2283, and their tone is restrictive. Dictum in
Atlantic Coast Line indicates that that Court was also concerned with
unwarranted expansion of the three exceptions beyond the scope of
Congress' intent. 6
Section 16 can, nevertheless, reasonably be found to be within the
scope of the section 2283 "expressly authorized" exception. Since 1793,
the Supreme Court has been more willing to except federal statutes from
section 2283's prohibition than Justice Rehnquist's requirement of "focus"
suggests, a tradition continued by Mitchum. Six statutes 67 were "implied
exceptions" before Toucey, and were retained even by that restrictive
opinion. 68 After the Toucey decision, the Supreme Court in two cases 69
established a seventh statutory exception-the Emergency Price Control
Act,7 ° which, as Justice Rehnquist conceded, does not "focus" on a state
court action.

71

The 1948 revision of section 2283 was not meant to restrict these
exceptions, but rather to return the law to the more liberal interpretations of
the pre-Toucey decisions. 72 Furthermore, the 1948 revision, as evidenced
by Mitchum, was not meant to restrict statutory exceptions to those already
recognized. The Mitchum Court's basis for finding section 1983 to be an
express exception was the legislative intent and history behind the statute; 73
the history of the Clayton Act provides a similar basis.
In 1914, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to strict enforcement of
the antitrust laws with the passage of the Clayton Act. 74 Section 16 expressly granted federal injunctive relief to private citizens to allow them to protect
themselves from violations of the Sherman Act before suffering financial
ruin. 75 Congress may not have been specifically concerned with state court
F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970) (same result and reasoning under the
Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, pt. 1, § 1,24 Stat. 379 (1887) (formerly codified, as amended,

at 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970)) (repealed 1976)).
Justice Stevens observed that United States Attorneys acting under the Sherman Act can
ask for injunctions against violations, including state court actions. As the Clayton Act was to
extend to private parties the same litigation powers possessed by the government, it is an
expressly authorized exception. 97 S. Ct. at 2896 nn.9 & 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. 398 U.S. at 287.
67. See note 23 supra.
68. See 314 U.S. at 139.
69. Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
70. Ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23 (1942). The act authorized the Price Administrator to apply
to the "appropriate court" for an injunction against "any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation of any provision . . . of this Act." Id.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2892 n.10.
72. See note 29 supra.
73. 407 U.S. at 242.
74. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
75. 97 S. Ct. at 2897 n.I I (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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actions as violations, but, as subsequent case law recognized, Congress
deliberately defined Sherman Act violations generally to cover all attempts
at circumvention of tie Act's prohibitions.7 6 Congress intended its grant of
private federal injunctive relief to be broad enough to curtail all attempts to
restrain trade illegally. To limit this relief by holding the section 2283 bar
applicable to section 16 would infringe on the intended scope of the statute;
thus, section 16 appears to satisfy the Mitchum test and should qualify as an
expressly authorized exception to section 2283.
Although plaintiffs lost their injunction, Vendo's impact will not
seriously weaken the antitrust laws; a majority of the justices held that
section 16 is an express exception under section 2283.11 Nor should the
decision cause state courts to fear a steady stream of encroachments on their
freedom from review by federal district courts; the opinion advocating the
exception focused-on the unique nature of the antitrust laws. 78 The Vendo
decision does, however; raise the question of the continuing usefulness of
section 2283, particularly in its present form, as a mechanism for preventing
needless friction between state and federal courts.
The likely effect of the decision is to allow Lektro-Vend's probably
meritorious7 9 antitrust claim to go unheard. In issuing its injunction, the
district court was not attempting to review the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court; the injunction was issued to temporarily restrain collection
of the judgment against Lektro-Vend to allow the company sufficient independence and financial resources to press its antitrust claim.8 0 Denying the
federal courts the latitude to hear a complaint grounded on a matter within
exclusive federal jurisdiction for the sake of immediate enforcement of a
state court judgment seems to be an inappropriate method of avoiding
conflict between the two judicial systems.
Justice Rehnquist refused to balance the importance of the federal
policies behind the Anti-Injunction Act and the antitrust laws, stating that
Congress, in enacting section 2283, reserved this judgment for itself.8 1 His
refusal, although supported by the language of Atlantic Coast Line and
Richman82 and a fair reading of the language of section 2283, is founded on
a uniquely inflexible interpretation of the statute. Even Justice Frankfurter,
author of the Toucey and Richman opinions, was willing to allow an extrastatutory exception, when he recognized the implied sovereignty excep83
tion.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See United States, v. American Tobacco'Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911).
See note 19 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2895-901 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. at 532.
See id. at 535.
97 S. Ct. at 2891.
See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
Leiter Minerals. Inc. v. United States. 352 U.S. 220 (1957). The exception was not

1978]

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

In addition, Congress, by allowing exceptions to its original flat prohibition, 84 recognized that there are federal policies that supersede that of
the Anti-Injunction Act. The question is whether the determination of what
these policies are is strictly reserved to Congress. The Reviser's Note
indicates that section 2283 was amended to restore the state of the law to the
more liberal pre-Toucey era.8 5 If this was indeed Congress' intention, the
language of the statute enumerating acceptable exceptions and the Court's
conclusion that these exceptions are to be construed narrowly, may have
circumvented it. The language of the statute was tailored to one restrictive
Supreme Court decision and was intended to expand rather than contract
allowable section 2283 exceptions.8 6 A literal reading of the language of
section 2283, particularly in light of Atlantic Coast Line and Richman, has
87
not led to this result.
The strongest protection the states have against federal interference
with their judicial proceedings is the self-restraint federal courts exercise in
deference to the concept of federalism. 88 During the early years of the
judiciary's growth, the Anti-Injunction Act may have been necessary to
define the state-federal judicial relationship and to emphasize to the federal
court judges that they were not to attempt any review function over state
court proceedings. The Act has served its purpose. Federal courts generally
recognize that even when an injunction is permissible under section 2283,
the court must determine whether such an injunction would violate general
89
principles of comity and federalism.
The Anti-Injunction Act was revised by Congress in 1948 and must be
adhered to by the federal courts. It is questionable, however, how effective
the provision is in its function of preserving state-federal relations. Justice
Frankfurter called section 2283 "continuing evidence of [Congress'] confidence in the state courts

.

.

.

to recognize the rather subtle line of demarca-

tion between exclusive federal and allowable state jurisdiction.'

'9

State-

only reaffirmed, but extended after the Atlantic Coast Line decision. NLRB v. Nash-Finch

Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); see note 65 supra.
84. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 29 supra.See also Durfee & Sloss, FederalInjunctionAgainst Proceedingsin

State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 1145, 1169 (1932). The authors
concluded that at the time they were writing, the Anti-Injunction Act provided no more
protection to state court independence than did recognized principles of comity and federalism.

They evidenced no sense of alarm or impropriety at this state of affairs.
86. See note 29 supra.

87. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra.
88. Between 1793 and 1941 the federal courts found it necessary to except only six federal
statutes from the prohibition. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.

89. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc., 498 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1050 (1974); Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.
1952); Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
90. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. at 518-19.
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federal relations would have been spared the confines of the strained
construction of section 2283 if Congress had evidenced the same confidence
in the federal courts.
MARY BROOKE LAMSON

Prisoners' Rights-Bowring v. Godwin: The Limited Right of

State Prisoners to Psychological and Psychiatric Treatment
According to statistics compiled by the American Correctional Association, between fifteen and twenty percent of the prisoner population in the
United States suffers from a diagnosable emotional or mental disturbance,
including neuroses, personality and behavioral disorders, and various prepsychotic and psychotic conditions. ' And yet, historically, the vast majority
of these prisoners have remained untreated due to an inadequacy of staff and
facilities, 2 as well as a general apathy towards the mental health of convicted
criminals.' In Bowring v. Godwin,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit expressly held that in certain narrowly defined situations
there is a definite nexus between the constitutional right of a prisoner to be
spared from cruel and unusual punishment5 and his right to receive psychological and/or psychiatric treatment. 6 According to the court, however, not
1. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 441
(3d ed. 1966). See also Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 948 (1975); Alexander, The Captive Patient: The Treatment of Health Problems in
American Prisons, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 16 (1972) (persons entering the federal prison
system have a 5% chance of severe psychiatric disturbance and 15% chance of serious
emotional disability).
2. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS (1972),

reprintedin ABA COMM.

ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, MEDICAL AND HEALTH

CARE IN JAILS, PRISONS, AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

67

(3d

ed. 1974); ArrICA:

THE

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972); SOUTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, SUMMARY OF SYSTEM AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF

MEDICAL SERVICES IN SOUTH CAROLINA CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM (1974), reprinted in

ABA

at 263.
3. See Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784 (1969);
Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment, II Am. CRIM. L. REV. 7
COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, supra

(1972). Behavior modification has received the most attention in recent years as a form of
treatment. This treatment is intended to conform behavior patterns to a socially acceptable
norm, not to discover and combat the root causes of mental illness. See O'Brien, Tokens and

Tiers in Corrections:An Analysis of Legal Issues in BehaviorModification, 3 NEW ENGLAND J.
PRISON L. 15 (1976).
4. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII in pertinent part provides: "[N]or [shall] cruel and unusual
punishments [be] inflicted."

6. 551 F.2d at 47-48.

